The Exemption from Patent Infringement
and Declaratory Judgments:
Misinterpretation of Legislative Intent?

The Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act
of 1984, partially codified as 35 U.S.C. section 271(e)(1), was enacted to encourage expenditure in the areas ofpharmaceuticaland
medical inventions, and to ensure greater competition in these
fields at an earlierdate after relevant patents expire. However, the
courts' interpretationof section 271(e)(1) may be preventing these
original goals of Congressfrom being met. Recently, courts have
based the denial of declaratory judgment actions upon section
271(e)(1). If interpreted as requiringthe denial of all declaratory
judgment suits, this statute may actually discourage companies
from expending the money necessary to obtain FDA approval.
INTRODUCTION

The United States patent system serves the constitutional purpose
of promoting the progress of science and the useful arts.' This purpose has historically been achieved through the careful balancing by
Congress of the needs of society to have access to new inventions
against the need to provide incentives to inventors by securing to
them exclusive rights in their inventions.
The patent system creates incentive to invent by rewarding innovation, which in turn benefits society by providing new and useful
products and improving technology.' Patent rights can be viewed as
1. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
2. Former President Dwight D. Eisenhower stated:
Soundly based on the principle of protecting and rewarding inventors, this system has for years encouraged the imaginative to dream and to experiment in garages and sheds, in great universities and corporate laboratories. From
such explorations on the frontiers of knowledge has welled a flood of innovations and discoveries which have created new industries and reactivated old,
giving more and more Americans better jobs and adding greatly to the prosperity and well-being of all.
1 ERNEST B. LIPSCOMB III. LIPscoMB's WALKER ON PATENTS § 1:9, at 58 (3d ed. 1984)
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a contract between an inventor and society: "The inventor receives
the right to control and profit from the first seventeen years of exploitation of this invention, and, in return," is obligated to disclose
this invention to the public. 3

"[D]isclosure of the invention gives the public the ability to develop or manufacture the product further after the patent term ex-

pires," and also allows other inventors to assess the scope of the
patent.4 Thus, from its inception, the patent system has attempted to
balance the incentive of a seventeen year monopoly5 with the interests of the public. 6

This concept was articulated by the Supreme Court in Graham v.
John Deere Co.:7
The patent monopoly was not designed to secure to the inventor his natural
(quoting Dwight D. Eisenhower).
3. Michael P. Chu, Note, An Antitrust Solution to the New Wave of Predatory
Patent Infringement Litigation, 33 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1341, 1346 (1992). The author explains the contract theory of patent rights as follows:
In exchange for the inventor's disclosure of an invention previously unknown to
the public, the government promises the inventor certain exclusive rights in the
invention for a limited period of time. As a part of this contract, the inventor
agrees to the government's publication of the invention upon expiration of the
patent. During the time the patent contract is in force, the public has access to
the published disclosure of the invention and can use its teachings in constructive thinking to forward the development of the art, whereby improvements are
often promulgated. Members of the public may also approach the patent owner
while the patent is in force seeking permission to practice the invention on
terms suitable to the patent owner.
Id. at 1347 n.38 (quoting DAVID A. BURGE. PATENT AND TRADEMARK TACTICS AND
PRACTICE

25 (2d ed. 1984)).

4. Id. at 1347. See also Schriber-Schroth Co. v. Cleveland Trust Co., 305 U.S. 47
(1938). The Schriber-Schroth Court stated:
The object of the statute is to require the patentee to describe his invention so
that others may construct and use it after the expiration of the patent and "to
inform the public during the life of the patent of the limits of the monopoly
asserted, so that it may be known which features may be safely used or manufactured without a license and which may not."
Id. at 57 (quoting Permutit Co. v. Graver Corp., 284 U.S. 52, 60 (1931)).
5. It has been argued that a patent is more a property right than a monopoly. See
LIPSCOMB III, supra note 2, § 1:9, at 59. "The right of an inventor to his invention is no
monopoly. It is no monopoly in any other sense than as a man's own house is a monopoly." Id. (quoting 1852 speech by Daniel Webster). But see Graham v. John Deere Co.,
383 U.S. 1, 9 n.2 (1966). The Graham Court stated:
If nature has made any one thing less susceptible than all others of exclusive
property, it is the action of the thinking power called an idea, which an individual may exclusively possess as long as he keeps it to himself; but the moment it
is divulged, it forces itself into the possession of every one . ...
Id. (quoting Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson (Aug. 1813), in VI
WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 180-81 (Washington ed. 1895)).
6. See Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Inv. Co., 320 U.S. 661, 665 (1944) ("It is
the public interest which is dominant in the patent system."); Vitamin Technologists,
Inc. v. Wisconsin Alumni Research Found., 146 F.2d 941, 944 (9th Cir. 1944) ("It is
now well established that a patentee may not put his property in the patent to a use
contra to the public interest.").
7. 383 U.S. 1 (1966).
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right in his discoveries. Rather, it was a reward, an inducement, to bring
forth new knowledge. The grant of an exclusive right to an invention was
the creation of society-at odds with the inherent free nature of disclosed
ideas-and was not to be freely given. Only inventions and discoveries
which furthered human knowledge, and were new and useful, justified the
special inducement of a limited private monopoly. 8

Thus, there has existed throughout history a continuous tension between the public interest in benefiting from inventions and the private interests of patent owners in fully exploiting the exclusive rights
afforded them. 9
Congress balanced these competing interests by passing the Drug
Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, part of
which is codified as 35 U.S.C. section 271(e)(1). 1° The purpose of
this Act was to create new incentives for expenditures for research
and development and to make more low cost drugs available on the
market. However, the courts' interpretation of section 271 (e) (1) may
be preventing these original goals of Congress from being met. In
particular, the courts have recently used this section as a basis for
denying declaratory judgment actions to both potential infringers
and patent owners." Such holdings could defeat the Act's goal of
increasing research and development expenditures.
This Comment reviews the courts' treatment of the Drug Price
Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984. Part I discusses the case history and legislative history of section 271(e)(1).
Part II discusses the use of declaratory judgments in cases of alleged
patent infringement, both when brought by the patentee and when
brought by the alleged infringer. Part III provides an analysis of the
recent cases involving declaratory judgment actions when the acts of
one party fall under the protection of section 271(e)(1). Part IV concludes with a discussion of the potentially harmful effects of the
8. Id. at 9. The Court discussed the ambivalence of the Framers of the Constitution in allowing the patent monopoly. "[Thomas] Jefferson, like other Americans, had an
instinctive aversion to monopolies. It was a monopoly on tea that sparked the Revolution
and Jefferson certainly did not favor an equivalent form of monopoly under the new
government." Id. at 7.
9. See generally A. Samuel Oddi, Beyond Obviousness: Invention Protection in
the Twenty-First Century, 38 AM. U. L. REv. 1097, 1097-106 (1989) (discussing the role
of the patent system in society).
10. Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L.
No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 355 and 35 U.S.C.
§§ 156, 271, 282 (1984)), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2647.
11. See Farmaceutisk Laboratorium Ferring v. Solvay Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 25
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1344 (N.D. Ga. 1992); Intermedics, Inc. v. Ventritex Co., 26
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1524 (Fed. Cir. 1993); Telectronics Pacing Sys., Inc. v. Ventritex,
Inc., 982 F.2d 1520 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
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courts' interpretation of section 271(e) (1).
I.

THE EXEMPTION TO INFRINGEMENT UNDER SECTION

A.

271(e)(1)

History of the Drug Price Competition Patent Term
Restoration Act of 1984

The Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of
1984 (PTR Act) 2 consists of two main titles: Title I addresses "Abbreviated New Drug Applications,"'" and Title II covers "Patent
Term Restoration."' 4 The PTR Act was enacted to serve two objectives: (1) to make more low cost generic drugs available to the public
and (2) to create new incentives for research and development of
certain products subject to premarket approval by the government.",
In enacting Title II of the PTR Act, Congress attempted to accomplish these objectives by correcting two unintended distortions of the
seventeen year patent monopoly as it applies to certain products that
require government approval prior to marketing. The first unintended distortion is a shortening of the useful life of the patent for a
new, "pioneer" drug or medical device. Because a patent is generally
obtained as soon as a potentially useful product is discovered, part of
the life of the patent is wasted during the time required to obtain
FDA approval of the new product prior to marketing. The second
distortion occurs at the other end of the patent term. Because use of
a patented product for the submission of data to the FDA was considered infringement,' 6 a party wishing to compete with the patentee
could not begin the process of obtaining FDA approval until after
the expiration of the patent. Thus, the patentee's de facto monopoly
would continue for an often substantial period of time until FDA
approval of competing products could be obtained.' 7
The PTR Act was the result of a compromise between two competing economic groups: the generic drug industry and the pioneer
drug industry. These groups each lobbied Congress for the passage
of legislation to eliminate the patent distortion most harmful to their
12.

Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, supra note

10.
13. Title I was codified as 21 U.S.C. § 355 (1984). The Abbreviated New Drug
Applications (ANDA) provision establishes a new generic drug approval procedure
which increases the rate at which generic drugs are approved by the FDA.
14. Title II was codified as 35 U.S.C. §§ 156, 271 (1984).
15. H.R. REP. No. 857, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. I, at 14-15 (1984), reprinted in
1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2647, 2648.
16. Roche Prods., Inc. v. Bolar Pharmaceutical Co., 733 F.2d 858 (Fed. Cir.
1984).
17. H.R. REP. No. 857, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 46 (1984), reprinted in 1984
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2647, 2679; see also Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 496 U.S. 661, 670
(1990).
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respective industries.' 8 After lengthy negotiations, these groups arrived at a compromise which they presented to key members of the

Senate and House. 19 This compromise was eventually enacted as the
PTR Act.
The PTR Act eliminated the first patent term distortion, the
shortening of the effective term of a patent, by providing for the ex-

tension of the seventeen year patent term for the earliest of certain

products subject to pre-market approval.2 0 The PTR Act added a
new section to the U.S. Patent Code, which allowed for patent term
extensions of "drug product[s,] medical devices, food additive[s],

[and] color additive[s] subject to regulation under the Federal Food,

Drug, and Cosmetic Act."' 2 ' The pioneer drug industry pressed for

the approval of this bill, which provides incentives for expenditure in
research and development by restoring to the inventor some of the

time lost on patent life while the product is awaiting pre-marketing
approval. 2
At the urging of the generic drug industry, 3 Congress also attempted to eliminate the second distortion of the patent term, the de
facto monopoly of the pioneer drug patent while competitors sought

FDA approval. This was accomplished by amending the Patent Code
to include section 271(e)(1), which provides that "[i]t shall not be

an act of [patent] infringement to make, use, or sell a patented invention . . . solely for uses reasonably related to the development
and submission of information under a Federal law which regulates

18. H.R. REP. No. 857, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 17-18 (1984), reprinted in
1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2647, 2650-51. The representatives of the pioneer pharmaceutical
industry testified before several congressional committees that the average effective patent term of drugs had declined due to government review of new drugs. These representatives argued that this decline would result in decreased expenditures for the research
and development of new drugs, and argued for patent term extensions to correct this loss
in patent term. Id. See also H.R. REP. No. 857, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 4 (1984),
reprintedin 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2686, 2688 (explaining that FDA rules on generic drug
approval have serious anti-competitive effects).
19. See Alan D. Lourie, Patent Term Restoration, 66 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 526
(1984) (describing the negotiations between the generic and pioneer drug industries
which resulted in the PTR Act).
20. H.R. REP. No. 857, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 15 (1984), reprinted in 1984
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2647, 2648.
21. 35 U.S.C. § 156(0(1) (1988).
22. H.R. REP. No. 857, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 4 (1984), reprinted in 1984
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2686, 2688. The pioneer drug industry was represented primarily by the
Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association.
23. Id. The generic drug industry was primarily represented by the Generic Pharmaceutical Industry Association.
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' Prior to section 271(e)(1),
the manufacture, use, or sale of drugs."24
gathering data for FDA approval before the expiration of a relevant
patent constituted patent infringement under section 271(a).2

The generic drug industry pressed for the passage of section

271(e)(1) to overrule previous court decisions which effectively extended a patentee's monopoly and frustrated the provision of generic

drug substitutes to the public.2 6 These court decisions, holding that

activity before the FDA constituted infringement, were Pfizer, Inc. v.

International Rectifier Corp.17 and Roche Products, Inc. v. Bolar
PharmaceuticalCo.2 8 These decisions were based upon interpreta-

tion of the common law infringement exception for experimental
use.29 In Pfizer, the court held that for activity to be classified under
the common law exemption for experimental use, the activity must
not be related to any commercial use. 30
Roche was decided on similar grounds, and followed the rule in
Pfizer. In Roche, the defendant generic drug company had engaged
in obtaining FDA approval of the generic form of Roche's patented
drug prior to the expiration of that patent. 1 The court held that
such use constituted infringement, because it was solely for business
purposes. Thus, the use did not fall within the common law experimental use exemption,32 which allowed for the use of patented prod33
ucts in certain situations without constituting infringement.
24. 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (1988).
25. Id. § 271(a) ("Except as otherwise provided in this title, whoever without authority makes, uses or sells any patented invention, within the United States during the
term of the patent therefor, infringes the patent.").
26. Susan E. Kopp, The Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration
Act of 1984: Is it a Healthy Long Term Solution?, 71 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 945, 953
(1989) (discussing generic industry's reasons for opposing the decision in Roche Prods.,
Inc. v. Bolar Pharmaceutical Co., 733 F.2d 858 (Fed. Cir. 1984)).
27. 217 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 157 (C.D. Cal. 1982).
28. 733 F.2d 858 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
29. The experimental use defense was first introduced by Justice Story in Whittemore v. Cutter, 29 F. Cas. 1120 (C.C.D. Mass. 1813) (No. 17,600), stating, in dictum,
that "it could never have been the intention of the legislature to punish a man, who
constructed such a [patented] machine merely for philosophical experiments, or for the
purpose of ascertaining the sufficiency of the machine to produce its described effects."
Id. at 1121.
30. Pfizer, 217 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 161 (holding that use of patented drug by generic drug manufacturer in performing clinical tests of drug prior to expiration of patent
constituted infringement).
31. Roche, 733 F.2d at 860.
32. Id. at 863. The court stated:
Bolar's intended "experimental" use is solely for business reasons and not
solely for amusement, to satisfy idle curiosity, or for strictly philosophical inquiry ....
Bolar may intend to perform "experiments," but unlicensed experiments conducted with a view to the adaption of the patented invention to the
experimentor's business is a violation of the rights of the patentee to exclude
others from using his patented invention.
Id.
33. Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents and the Progressof Science: Exclusive Rights
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Through the PTR Act, Congress passed section 271(e)(1) to overrule Bolar specifically.3 4 The reason for this Congressional overruling
is explained in the history of the PTR Act as follows: "Article 1,
Section 8, Clause 8 of the Constitution empowers Congress to grant
exclusive rights to an inventor for a limited time. That limited time
should be a definite time and, thereafter, immediate competition

should be encouraged.

35

Section 271(e)(1) was not met with complete approval. Several

members of Congress were concerned that section 271(e)(1) would
drastically alter patent law. For instance, Congressman Moorhead
stated that
[e]nactment of this section would create an unprecedented exception to the
exclusionary rights to which a patent holder is entitled during the patent
term. Overturning the Bolar decision would allow experimental use of a
drug product prior to the expiration of the patent. There is no legitimate
basis for distinguishing between the exclusionary rights accorded a pharmaceutical manufacturer during the patent term and those enjoyed by any
other patent holder...
For this reason, section 202 should be amended to permit experimental
use of a drug by a non-patentee only during the period for which the patent
has been extended.30

In spite of such controversy, the Patent Code was amended to include section 271(e) (1).
B. Application of The Patent Term Restoration Act
The PTR Act was the result of a narrow compromise between the

generic and pioneer pharmaceutical industries.37 However, since the
passing of section 271(e)(1), contained in section 202 of the PTR

Act, the courts have progressively expanded this element of the
"compromise" beyond anything contemplated by either the generic
and Experimental Use, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1017 (1989) (discussing the experimental use

exception and arguing that even this narrow exception to infringement might be too
broad).
34. H.R. REP. No. 857, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 45-46 (1984), reprinted in
1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2647, 2678-79. The Act sought to overrule the decision in Roche,
because "[i]t is the Committee's view that experimental activity does not have any adverse economic impact on the patent owner's exclusivity during the life of a patent, but
prevention of such activity would extend the patent owner's commercial exclusivity beyond the patent expiration date." Id.
35. Id. at 46, reprintedin 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2679.
36. 130 CONG. REC. 24,456-57 (1984).
37. Lourie, supra note 19, at 544 (explaining that while the bill was not entirely
satisfactory to either the generic or pioneer pharmaceutical industries, both groups testified to Congress that they supported the bill and considered it to be the best compromise
obtainable).
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and pioneer pharmaceutical industries or by Congress.
The first expansion of section 271(e)(1) occurred in the Supreme
Court decision Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic Inc.,38 in which the
Court held that section 271(e)(1) applies to medical devices as well
as to drugs. In this case, Eli Lilly owned a patent on an implantable
cardiac defibrillator, a medical device used in the treatment of heart
patients. Eli Lilly brought an infringement action against another
manufacturer, Medtronic, alleging that Medtronic's testing of the
defibrillator infringed upon Lilly's patent. 9 Medtronic defended on
the ground that its activities were undertaken to develop and submit
to the FDA the information necessary to obtain marketing approval
for the device, and thus were exempt from a claim of infringement
under section 271(e)(1). 40 In deciding the case in favor of Medtronic, the Supreme Court reasoned that although the statute is ambiguous, it is more naturally construed to include any patented
invention that is regulated by the FDA. 41 The Court reasoned that
since the purpose of the PTR Act was to remedy the distortions at
both ends of the patent term, section 271(e)(1) should apply to any
product eligible for patent term extension under section 156.42 Thus,
even though section 271(e)(1) fails to expressly include products
other than drugs, the Court's ruling effectively expanded section
271(e)(1) to include any product which is regulated by the FDA.
While there are policy arguments both for and against this expansion of section 271(e)(1) to medical devices,4 3 the end result is an
expansion of section 271(e)(1) beyond that which was considered by
38. 496 U.S. 661 (1990).
39. Id. at 664.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 665. The Court stated that the statutory phrase of section 271(e)(1), "a
Federal law which regulates the manufacture, use, or sale of drugs," is ambiguous. Id.
(quoting 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (1982)).
It is somewhat more naturally read (as Medtronic asserted) to refer to the entirety of
any Act, including the FDCA [Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act] at least some of
whose provisions regulate drugs, rather than (as Eli Lilly contended) to only those individual provisions of federal law that regulate drugs. However, the text, by itself, is imprecise and not plainly comprehensible on either view.
42. Id. at 672. The Court stated:
It seems most implausible to us that Congress, being demonstrably aware of
the dual distorting effects of the regulatory approval requirements . . . should
choose to address both those distortions only for drug products; and for other
products named in .. .[section 156] should enact provisions which not only
leave in place an anticompetitive restriction at the end of the monopoly term
but simultaneously expand the monopoly term itself, thereby not only failing to
eliminate but positively aggravating the distortion of the 17-year patent
protection.
Id. at 672-73.
43. Todd A. Rathe, Medical Device Experimental Use Exception in Patent Infringement: Eli Lilly v. Medtronic, 16 J.CORP. L. 625, 639-42 (1991) (discussing policies
supporting and opposing the Court's decision).
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Congress in the passing of the PTR Act.44
A second and potentially more harmful expansion of section
271(e)(1) is the denial of declaratory judgment actions when one
party is gathering data for the FDA approval of a product which the
party intends to market prior to the expiration of the relevant patent.
In several recent cases, section 271(e)(1) has been used to deny declaratory
judgment actions to both potential infringers and patent
45
owners.
A review of the use of declaratory judgments in patent cases is
given below in Part II to explain the importance of these actions in
the patent system.

II.

DECLARATORY JUDGMENT ACTIONS IN PATENT LAW

Declaratory judgment actions are useful procedures for establishing the respective rights of patent owners and potential infringers.4 6
When used by patent owners in infringement litigation, declaratory
judgment actions expand intellectual property protection by providing an additional procedural remedy. 47 In the hands of potential infringers, declaratory judgment actions can be used to prevent patent
owners from abusing the power of their patents by inhibiting competition. 48 These actions help assure that society receives adequate benefit for the granting of the patent monopoly.

44. Ellen J. Flannery & Peter B. Hutt, Balancing Competition and Patent Protection in the Drug Industry: The Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration
Act of 1984, 40 FOOD DRUG CosM. L.J. 269 (1985). "Because section 271(e) was intended solely to overrule ... [Roche], it is narrow in application. This statutory provision applies only to a patented human drug product, not to any other invention." Id. at
308.
45. See Farmaceutisk Laboratorium Ferring v. Solvay Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 25
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1344 (N.D. Ga. 1992); Intermedics, Inc. v. Ventritex Co., 26
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1524 (Fed. Cir. 1993); Telectronics Pacing Sys., Inc. v. Ventritex,
Inc., 982 F.2d 1520 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
46. See 6A JAMES W. MOORE, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 57.20 (2d ed.
1982).
47. See 10A CHARLES A. WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 2751 (2d ed. 1983) (stating that availability of declaratory judgment remedy expands
judicial discretion).
48. Societe de Conditionnement en Aluminium v. Hunter Eng'g Co., 655 F.2d 938,
943 (9th Cir. 1981). "The availability of declaratory relief serves both judicial efficiency
and the policies underlying the patent laws. Before passage of the Act, a patentee had
more protection for his invention than his statutory monopoly warranted." Id.
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Use of Declaratory Judgments by Potential Infringers

A.

From the perspective of a party threatened with potential liability,

a declaratory judgment provides a means by which to avoid waiting
until the opposing party decides to bring a suit, possibly at a time

after the damage has occurred. 49 Declaratory judgment thus minimizes the danger of avoidable loss and the unnecessary accrual of
damages. For the potential infringer, declaratory judgment permits
the settlement of controversies before his actions develop into actual
violations of law.5 0 The availability of declaratory judgment actions
prevents a patent owner from suppressing the competition with
threats of infringement suits without actually having to subject its
patent to the test of litigation.5 1 The effect of declaratory judgment

actions may be explained as follows:
[I]t may be noted that the availability of declaratory relief has destroyed
the "racket" by which patentees gained manifold advantage by the device
of threatening alleged infringers or their customers with lawsuits which
might never be brought or, if brought, could always be dismissed without
such persons taking steps to ascertain
prejudice, without the possibility of 52
the validity of the patentee's claims.

Declaratory relief can thus afford parties a practical, expedient, and
inexpensive means for determining their respective rights in a single
proceeding. 53 Such an expedient means is very desirable in intellectual property disputes, where enormous financial liabilities are at
stake and5 4 substantial damages are awarded when a patent is
infringed.
B.

Use of Declaratory Judgments by Patent Owners

While declaratory relief has traditionally been available to poten-

tial infringers, a more recent development in patent law is the availability of declaratory judgment actions to patent owners. Such suits
allow a patent owner to prevent injury to its market position by testing whether a potentially infringing product will actually infringe
49. See E. Edelmann & Co. v. Triple-A Specialty Co., 88 F.2d 852, 854 (7th Cir.
1937), cert. denied, 300 U.S. 680 (1937) (noting that in promulgating the Declaratory
Judgment Act, Congress intended "to avoid accrual of avoidable damages to one not
certain of his rights and to afford him early adjudication without waiting until his adversary should see fit to begin suit.").
50. Maryland Casualty Co. v. Rosen, 445 F.2d 1012, 1014 (2d Cir. 1971).
51. See Arrowhead Indus. Water, Inc. v. Ecolochem, Inc. 846 F.2d 731, 734-35
(Fed. Cir. 1988) (explaining the benefits of the availability of declaratory relief to potential infringers).
52. Wembley, Inc. v. Superba Cravats, Inc., 315 F.2d 87, 89 (2d Cir. 1963).
53. See Smith v. Transit Casualty Co., 281 F. Supp. 661, 670 (E.D. Tex. 1968)
(stating that declaratory judgment is less costly than protracted litigation).
54. 35 U.S.C. § 284 (1988) (explaining that a patentee may recover up to three
times the damages found by a court for patent infringement).
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before it is introduced into the marketplace. Although the use of declaratory judgment by a patent owner against a potential infringer
was first allowed in 1963,15 the acceptance of such suits has been
slow, and a significant number of decisions have taken the position
that such suits are not proper under any circumstances." 6
An important case in establishing the availability of declaratory
relief for patent owners was Lang v. Pacific Marine and Supply
Co.57 In this case the court held that declaratory relief should be

available to patentees in situations where a potential infringer could
maintain a similar action.58 As the court in Lang stated: "We see no
reason why a patentee should be unable to seek a declaration of infringement against a future infringer when a future infringer is able
to maintain a declaratory judgment action for noninfringement
under the same circumstances." 59 Thus, the duality of declaratory
judgment was established. The resolution of disputes by declaratory
judgment, whether brought by the potential infringer or patentee,
clearly fulfills the legislative intent of the Declaratory Judgment
Act.60

55. Proler Steel Corp. v. Luria Bros. & Co., 223 F. Supp. 87 (S.D. Tex. 1963)
(holding that patent owners may employ declaratory actions against potential infringers).
56. See Swedlow, Inc. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 455 F.2d 884, 886-87 (9th Cir. 1972)
(arguing that conventional use of declaratory judgment precludes use by patent owners
who have a corollary remedy available in patent infringement suit); see also I DONALD
S. CHISUM. PATENTS § 21.02[1], at 21-89 to 21-90 (1994). Chisum explains the concerns
of courts causing them to rule against such suits:
First is [the] concern that [the] defendant may not actually go forth with its
threatened acts or may so alter them as to change the issues substantially.
Thus to rule on a declaratory judgment would be to render an advisory opinion
....Second is the concern that the patent owner, unlike an infringer, already
has an express statutory remedy. . . .Third is [the] concern that entertaining
such suits will subvert the restrictive venue provision in 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b).
Id.
57. 895 F.2d 761 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
58. Id. at 764.
59. Id.
60. Altvater v. Freeman, 319 U.S. 359, 365 (1943) (citing S. REP. No. 1005, 73d
Cong., 2d Sess. 2-3 (1934)) (stating that the purpose of the Declaratory Judgment Act is
to afford relief against "peril and insecurity" of potential damages in infringement suits);
see also Wembly Inc. v. Superba Cravats, Inc., 315 F.2d 87, 90 (2d Cir. 1963) (arguing
that the rationale for allowing declaratory judgment is avoidance of economic waste incurred in embarking on a program of manufacture, use, or sale that turns out to be
illegal).
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C. Operation of the Declaratory Judgment Act: The Need for an
Actual Controversy
Jurisdiction under the Declaratory Judgment Act is not dependent
on the actual commission of an infringing act. Because the purpose
of the Declaratory Judgment Act is to allow a party to ascertain his
or her rights before damages accrue and economic waste is incurred,
this purpose would be thwarted if a judicial determination of rights
could not be secured prior to any act of infringement."1 For a court
to grant declaratory relief, the declaratory judgment action must
contain a "true and actual controversy. 6 2
The Supreme Court developed a general two-prong test to assist
courts in determining if a controversy exists.63 Courts have applied
this test to cases both where the plaintiff is the potential infringer
and where the plaintiff is the patentee. For a holding of justiciability
under the Declaratory Judgment Act when the plaintiff is the potential infringer, the two elements of the test are: (1) The defendant's
conduct must have created on the part of the plaintiff a reasonable
apprehension of a charge of infringement by the defendant, and (2)
the plaintiff must be engaging in the infringing acts or have the ability and intention to immediately engage in such acts.64
For such a holding when the plaintiff is the patentee, the defendant must be engaged in an activity subject to an infringement charge
under section 271(a), 65 or be in the meaningful preparation for such
an activity. In addition, "acts of the defendant must indicate a refusal to change the course of its actions in the face of acts by the
patentee sufficient to create a reasonable apprehension that a suit
will be forthcoming. 6
In declaratory judgment actions brought by potential infringers,
the first criterion of the test for actual controversy - requiring a
reasonable apprehension of a suit for infringement - has been liberally construed by the courts, and an express charge of infringement
by the defendant is not required.6 7 The conduct of the patent owner
61. Jerry D. Voight, DeclaratoryJudgment Actions in Patent Cases Where There
Has Been No Act of Infringement, 72 J. PAT. OFF. SOC'Y 1136, 1141 (1990) (reviewing
case law in which declaratory judgments have been sought by either alleged infringers or
patent owners to resolve disputes prior to commission of any act that would constitute
patent infringement).
62. 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1988 & Supp. V 1993) ("In a case of actual controversy
."); see also Arrowhead Indus. Water, Inc. v. Ecolochem, Inc., 846 F.2d 731, 735
(Fed. Cir. 1988).
63. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Releasomers, Inc., 824 F.2d 953, 955 (Fed.
Cir. 1987).
64. Arrowhead, 846 F.2d at 736.
65. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (1988) (defining infringement as the making, using, or
selling of a patented product).
66. Lang v. Pacific Marine & Supply Co., 895 F.2d 761, 764 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
67. Arrowhead, 846 F.2d at 736 (stating that "[iln light of the subtleties in lawyer
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must be examined to determine the reasonableness of the apprehension of an infringement suit.6" Reasonable apprehension can be created through various means short of an actual charge of
infringement, including letters sent to a competitor or his customers
by the patent owner, 69 or a history of litigation by the patent owner
to enforce patent rights. 70 Although the reasonable apprehension criterion of the test is more liberally construed for plaintiffs who are
potential infringers than for plaintiffs who are patent owners, the
court in Lang also made this prong of the test somewhat easier for
patent owners, stating that "[a] concern that the alleged future infringer might alter its course of conduct

. . .

should not cause a dis-

'71
missal any more than it should in a suit by the accused infringer.
The most difficult aspect for either patent owners or potential infringers in suits brought prior to an actual act of infringement is
establishing the immediacy of the future infringer's ability to make,
sell, or use a patented product. 72 For a determination of justiciability, "[m]ajor stress should be placed on the 'definite' intention
of the plaintiff to take 'immediate' action to utilize its potential and
this intention should be 'evident' from the preparatory steps outlined

in its complaint.

' 73

A party must be able and ready and have the

intent,
capacity, and power to perform the potentially infringing
74
act.

language, however, the courts have not required an express infringement charge").
68. Id. The Arrowhead court stated:
If the circumstances warrant, a reasonable apprehension may be found in the
absence of any communication from defendant to plaintiff . . . .If, on the
other hand, defendant has done nothing but obtain a patent, there can be no
basis for the required apprehension, a rule that protects quiescent patent owners against unwarranted litigation.
Id. (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
69. Sticker Indus. Supply Corp. v. Blaw-Knox Co., 367 F.2d 744 (7th Cir. 1966).
70. Sweetheart Plastics, Inc. v. Illinois Tool Works, Inc., 439 F.2d 871, 874 (1st
Cir. 1971).
71. Lang v. Pacific Marine & Supply Co., 895 F.2d 761, 764 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
72. General Tire & Rubber Co. v. Jefferson Chem. Co., 46 F.R.D. 607, 610
(S.D.N.Y. 1969) (explaining that although the requirements for declaratory judgment
had relaxed to allow actions to proceed before any act of infringement had occurred,
there was still a need for "presenting proof of the concurrence of some form of present or
potential infringement").
73. Wembly, Inc. v. Superba Cravats, Inc., 315 F.2d 87, 90 (2d Cir. 1963).
74. Zenith Lab. Inc. v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1641,
1645 (D.N.J. 1991) (opinion not for publication).
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D. Declaratory Judgments and the Contingency of FDA
Approval
The existence of conditions precedent to, or contingencies upon the
ability of a party to market a product have caused courts to find that
no actual controversy exists. Consequently, it has often been difficult
to establish an actual controversy when the potentially infringing
party is seeking the approval of the FDA for its product.76 However,
since a controversy sufficient to support a declaratory judgment action for threatened infringement is not precluded because of the absence of current infringement, 6 the contingency of FDA approval is
not always fatal to the finding of justiciability. First, courts look to a
potential infringer's level of preparation and present expenditures on
the manufacture of the product to determine the existence of an actual controversy. Courts place emphasis upon the certainty or definiteness that the alleged infringing activity would occur, rather than
on the immediacy of the occurrence. 77 The level of preparation can
be used to show the intent and capacity of a party to market an
infringing product. As the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals stated
in Arrowhead Industrial Water, Inc. v. Ecolochem, Inc., "[w]hether
a declaratory plaintiff's ability and definite intention to undertake a
potentially infringing activity constitutes sufficient 'preparation' is a
question of degree to be resolved on a case-by-case basis."17 8 Thus,
even when marketing is contingent upon FDA approval, courts may
find that sufficient preparation has occurred to support the finding of
an actual controversy.
Second, courts have also found that activities related to the seeking of FDA approval can suffice to show the existence of an actual
controversy. For example, in Zenith Laboratories, Inc. v. BristolMyers Squibb Co.,79 the plaintiff was a potential infringer that
75. Id. at 1646 (stating that "[w]here certain barriers exist to marketing of product, and it is uncertain that market conditions would be favorable at time barriers are
removed 'there is simply not a sufficient degree of immediacy to warrant the issuance of
a declaratory judgment'" (citations omitted)).
76. See Automation Sys., Inc. v. Intel Corp., 501 F. Supp. 345, 347 (S.D. Iowa
1980) ("It will be to no one's advantage to wait for a consideration of the infringing
character of a product or process until the actual infringement takes place since this only
serves to increase the resulting potential economic harm."); see also Kasper v. Cooper
Canada Ltd., 688 F. Supp. 347, 352 (N.D. Ill. 1988) (stating that a requirement that
there be actual infringement before a declaratory judgment action could proceed would
completely defeat the purpose of declaratory relief).
77. Ethicon, Inc. v. American Cyanamid Co., 369 F. Supp. 934 (D.N.J. 1973)
(finding that an actual controversy existed even though the marketing of the potentially
infringing product was contigent upon FDA approval, which might take a considerable
amount of time).
78. Arrowhead Water Indus., Inc. v. Ecolochem, Inc., 846 F.2d 731, 736 (Fed.
Cir. 1988).
79. Zenith Lab., Inc. v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1641
(D.N.J. 1991).
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sought to market its product upon FDA approval, prior to the expiration of the relevant patent. The court held that the "use" of a
patented product in connection with submissions to the FDA constituted infringement, and thus established the existence of an actual
controversy. 0
The court in Zenith also addressed the discretionary nature of the
Declaratory Judgment Act. Even when actual controversies exist,
courts are given discretion in declaratory actions in order to "enable
the court to make a reasoned judgment whether the investment of
judicial time and resources in a declaratory action will prove worthwhile in resolving a justiciable dispute."8 " The important elements in
a court's use of its discretion to allow declaratory relief are (1)
whether a delay in an adjudication of rights will result in harm that
would be avoided by an immediate declaration of those rights, and
(2) whether a useful purpose would be achieved by deciding a
party's rights.8 2
The court in Zenith found that two "useful purposes" would be
achieved by a declaration of Zenith's rights. First, the declaration
would allow Zenith to make an informed decision whether to continue prosecution of its application before the FDA, to abandon the
application, or to amend it to reflect Zenith's intent to wait until the
expiration of the Bristol-Myers patent to market its product.8 3 Second, the court found that a declaration of Zenith's rights, if Zenith's
product did not infringe, would avoid any delay in the marketing of
this product. This would result in a lower cost drug becoming availa4
ble to the public more quickly.
The court's decision in Zenith is consistent with the purpose of the
Declaratory Judgment Act and with the purpose of the U.S. Patent
system. The decision provides for an early adjudication of rights,
which saves money and allows for the earlier marketing of products

80. Id. at 1647.
81. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Norton Co., 929 F.2d 670, 672 (Fed. Cir.
1991).
82. Id. at 673; Zenith Lab., 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1647. The Zenith court
stated: "The decision to exercise declaratory judgment jurisdiction requires a balancing
of competing considerations. The Court's interest in 'conserving limited judicial resources' must be balanced against the interest of 'a party threatened with legal action in
obtaining an early adjudication of its rights and liabilities.'" Id.
83. Zenith Lab., 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1647.
84. Id. The court stated: "If in fact [Zenith's product] does not infringe Bristol's
rights, the public is entitled as soon as possible to the benefit of that product, most likely
at a cost lower than is currently available from Bristol or its licensees." Id.
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which benefit the public. However, some courts have reached decisions contrary to the holding in Zenith and have denied declaratory
relief in cases where one party is seeking FDA approval. In particular, the use of the exemption to infringement under section 271(e) (1)
has caused courts to deny declaratory relief to parties in situations
similar to Zenith.
IV.

SECTION

271(e)(1)

AS A BASIS FOR DENIAL OF DECLARATORY

JUDGMENTS

In two recent decisions, Intermedics, Inc. v. Ventritex Co.", and
Telectronics Pacing Systems, Inc. v. Ventritex, Inc.,"8 the Federal
Circuit Court of Appeals denied patentees' declaratory judgment ac'
tions because they did not present a "sufficient case of controversy" 7
on which it could make a decision.8 8 The court based its rulings on
the fact that the defendant's acts, which would normally constitute
infringement under 271 (a) of the Patent Act, 9 were protected by an
exception found in section 271(e)(1) of the same act. This ruling
eliminated the ability of the patent owners to prevent any injury to
their market position caused by the defendant's introduction of an
infringing product to the marketplace. If section 271(e)(1) had not
been applied, under the rule of Roche, the acts of the defendants
could have been found to constitute infringement. 90
One commentator correctly observed that section 271(e)(1) was
intended to "reverse Roche, only to the extent that a company had
no intent to commercialize the invention before the patent expiration
date."9 " This position is supported by language in the PTR Act,
which explains the purpose of the Act as follows: "Finally, Title II
provides that it is not an act of patent infringement for a generic
drug maker to import or to test a patented drug in preparation for
seeking FDA approval if marketing of the drug would occur after
the expiration of the patent. '92 This interpretation of section
85.

26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1524 (Fed. Cir. 1993). The Intermedics court upheld

the district court's ruling that Ventritex's allegedly infringing uses of its implantable
defibrillator fell within the patent infringement clinical trial exemption of 35 U.S.C.
§ 271(e)(1) and that the application of this exemption precluded granting declaratory

relief to Intermedics. Id.
86. 982 F.2d 1520 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
87. Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). For a
general discussion see supra notes 61-74 and accompanying text.
88. Intermedics, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1528; Telectronics, 982 F.2d at 1526.

89.

35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (1988), which states: "Except as otherwise provided in this

title, whoever without authority makes, uses or sells any patented invention, within the
United States during the term of the patent therefor, infringes the patent." Id.
90. See supra notes 31-33 and accompanying text.
91. Lourie, supra note 19, at 541.
92. H.R. REP. No. 857, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1,at 15 (1984), reprinted in 1984
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2647, 2648 (emphasis added).
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271(e)(1) would be most consistent with the dual intent of the PTR
Act: making low cost generic drugs available to the public, and creating new incentives for research and development of products subject to FDA approval.
Unfortunately, courts do not appear to be using this interpretation. In Intermedics, Inc. v. Ventritex Co.,93 the Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit affirmed the decision of the district court, 94
which had denied declaratory relief to the plaintiff. The plaintiff, Intermedics, had reason to believe that Ventritex would begin the marketing of their potentially infringing product prior to the expiration
of Intermedics' patents. 95 Ventritex had developed an implantable
defibrillator, named "Cadence," which Intermedics claimed infringed seven of its patents relating to implantable defibrillators.9"
Intermedics identified several activities by Ventritex which Intermedics believed constituted infringement under section 271(a).
These activities included manufacturing several hundred Cadences,
selling the Cadence to hospitals in the U.S. and to international distributors, testing the Cadence, and demonstrating the Cadence at
medical trade shows. 97 Ventritex admitted that it intended to market
the Cadence as soon as it secured FDA approval, even if this was
before the expiration of Intermedics' patents. 98 However, Ventritex
argued that because its uses of the Cadence were all related to the
seeking of FDA approval, 99 it was entitled to the exemption under
section 271(e)(1). 100 Intermedics argued that the exemption under

section 271(e)(1) for the making, using, and selling activities should
not apply upon a showing that Ventritex intended to commercialize
their allegedly infringing product before Intermedics' patent expired.
The court denied declaratory relief, stating that there was no suggestion in the language of section 271(e)(1) that a producer may not
use the exemption if it intends to commercialize the product before
the expiration of the relevant patents. 10 1 The court went on to state
93. 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1524 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
94. Intermedics, Inc. v. Ventritex Co., 775 F. Supp. 1269, 1272 (N.D. Cal.
1991).
95. Intermedics, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1524.
96. Intermedics, 775 F. Supp. at 1272.
97. Id. at 1280.
98. Id. at 1275.
99. Id. at 1281-85.
100. Intermedics, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1525.
101. Id. The court explained that "[i]f the statutory language is clear, the plain
meaning of the statute controls. The plain language of section 271 (e)(1) does not contain
the limitation that Intermedics desires to find therein." Id. at 1528 (citations omitted).
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that even if the statutory language of section 271(e)(1) were not
clear, the legislative history of the PTR Act of 1984 does not support
the position proposed by Intermedics.'0 2 The court based this finding
upon the fact that "Congress specifically rejected an amendment to
the Act that would have permitted testing only during the last year
of any patent term."' 03
However, the court's reliance on the legislative history was flawed.
In stating its reasons for rejecting that proposed amendment, Congress made it clear that the rejection was based on the fact that
Congressman Moorhead's proposed amendment would not eliminate
the extension of a patentee's de facto monopoly. Congress explained
their reasoning as follows:
The Committee rejected the Moorhead amendment for two reasons. First,
the only activity which will be permitted by the bill is a limited amount of
testing so that generic manufacturers can establish the bioequivalency of a
generic substitute. The patent holder retains the right to exclude others
from the major commercial marketplace during the life of the patent ...
Second, .

.

. the Committee reasoned that without section 202 generic

manufacturers would be required to engage in these bioequivalency tests
after the expiration of the patent. This would result in delays of about two
years after the expiration of the patent before a generic could go on the
market."'

This discussion makes it clear that the reason for the rejection of
Congressman Moorhead's amendment was not that Congress intended section 271(e)(1) to provide shelter for all products seeking
FDA approval, regardless of when these products are to be commercialized. Rather, the amendment was rejected because, by only allowing FDA activity of a generic substitute in the last year of a
patent, the amendment hindered the goal of getting generic substitutes on the market as soon as possible after the expiration of the
relevant patents.
In addition, in both Intermedics and in a similar case, Telectronics Pacing Systems, Inc. v. Ventritex, Inc., 10 5 the Federal Circuit
reached its decision that section 271(e)(1) applied by broadly interpreting the statutory language "solely for uses reasonably related to"
obtaining FDA approval. 0 6 The court chose to focus upon the words
"reasonably related to" and all but ignored the word "solely." In
both cases, the defendant in the declaratory judgment action had
102. Id. at 1528. The court stated that "the legislative history of section 271(e)(1)
does not support the reading Intermedics proposes, even though Congress was clearly
aware of the economic repercussions of the section 271(e)(1) exemption." Id.
103. Id. (referring to the amendment proposed by Mr. Moorhead, discussed supra
note 36 and accompanying text).
104. H.R. REP. No. 857, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 8 (1984), reprinted in 1984
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2686, 2692.
105. 982 F.2d 1520 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
106. 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (1988).
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demonstrated their potentially infringing product at medical conferences, disseminated data obtained from clinical trials to physicians
and investors, and otherwise used their data and product to create a
ready market once FDA approval was granted. 107 While such uses
would not constitute infringement under section 271(a), they clearly
are not "solely" related to the obtaining of FDA approval, and thus
section 271(e)(1) should not apply. Courts have held that a court
"should avoid an interpretation of a statute that renders any part of
it superfluous and does not give effect to all of the words used by
Congress."'0 8 Eliminating the word "solely" from section 271(e)(1)
would clearly be contrary to Congress' intent to enact a narrow compromise between pioneer and generic drug companies.
Another case, Farmaceutisk Laboratorium Ferring v. Solvay
Pharmaceuticals,Inc., 09 illustrates that section 271(e)(1) is also being used to deny declaratory relief sought by potential infringers. In
Farmaceutisk, the plaintiff, Farmaceutisk, sued for infringement,
and the defendant, Solvay, counterclaimed seeking a declaratory
judgment that Farmaceutisk's patent"10 was invalid, and that
Solvay's competing product did not infringe this patent."' The court
dismissed Farmaceutisk's infringement suit, but agreed to hear
Solvay's counterclaim.. 2 Solvay was in the process of conducting
clinical trials for its tablets containing 5-ASA, and was supplying
the drugs to physicians to collect information for submission to the
FDA." 3' Solvay had not yet filed a New Drug Application with the
FDA, but stated that it intended to do so within the year, and further contended that it would not change the formulation of its product during the FDA approval process." 4 Solvay presented these
arguments to show that its actions represented the sufficient "preparation to produce" the product necessary to ensure that an actual
controversy exists which would warrant a declaratory judgment action." Farmaceutisk contended that Solvay's declaratory judgment

107. Telectronics, 982 F.2d at 1523; Intermedics, 775 F.2d at 1280.
108. Beisler v. Commissioner, 814 F.2d 1304, 1307 (9th Cir. 1987).
109. 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1344, 1346 (N.D. Ga. 1992).
110. Id. at 1346. The patent, U.S. Patent No. 4,496,553, described a method for
treating ulcerative colitis by orally administering 5-aminosalicylic acid [hereinafter 5ASA]. Id.
1II. Id.
112. Id. at 1347.
113. Id. at 1346.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 1350.
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action should be denied, since Solvay's actions were protected by section 271(e)(1), and thus it was not in an immediate position to infringe."' The court acknowledged the need for Solvay to establish its
rights prior to expending time and resources on the prosecution of an
application with the FDA. The court stated,
Solvay, if at all possible, simply does not want to assume the financial risk

of pending litigation years down the road after having expended significant
additional resources on the project. Solvay would prefer to have what it

considers the ripe issues
of the patent's invalidity and its product's infringe11 7
ment resolved now.

The court, however, declined to hear Solvay's declaratory judgment
action on the issue of infringement."" The court found that the issue
of infringement was too remote, because Solvay was clearly within
the provisions of section 271(e)(1), and therefore not infringing
Farmaceutisk's patent. 119
The court in Farmaceutisk did agree to hear Solvay's declaratory
judgment action on the issue of the validity of Farmaceutisk's patent. 120 The court explained its policy reasons for this decision:
[P]ermitting new drug manufacturers, at their choosing and subject to

court discretion, to test the validity of a patent-in-issue early on in the development process best serves the competing interests of protecting valid

patents, protecting new drug manufacturers during the testing process, and
moving alternative drugs into the market. 21

While this is a step in the right direction, it would be far preferable for parties to be able to establish their rights on both the issue of
patent validity and infringement at the same time, thus avoiding further litigation. Many companies, like Solvay or Zenith, 22 wish to
clear the infringement hurdle at the same time they clear the FDA
hurdle. Such companies may be reluctant to invest the resources necessary to successfully prosecute an application before the FDA if
they are unsure whether their product infringes a patented product.
The interpretation of section 271(e)(1) used by the court in
Farmaceutiskprevents companies from obtaining the early adjudication of rights needed by such companies to determine whether they
should continue to invest in the development of their new products.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 1351.
119. Id. at 1351-52. The court added that it was not "legally clear when Solvay
will leave the safe harbor and be subject to an infringement action." Id. at 1352.
120. Id. at 1351 ("Unlike the alleged infringing product, the patent is a fixed target which will not change and is only subject to a judicial determination as to its scope
and validity.").
121. Id. at 1353.
122. See supra notes 79-84 and accompanying text.
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V.

CONCLUSION

Although courts are justified in abstaining from granting declaratory relief where no actual controversy exists, the courts should not
automatically find that no actual controversy exists whenever one
party is seeking FDA approval. The finding that one party is within
section 271 (e) (1) should not be automatic; it should depend upon the
circumstances of the case.
In the passing of the PTR Act, Congress intended to do "what the
Congress has traditionally done in the area of intellectual property
law; balance the need to stimulate innovation against the goal of furthering the public interest."'12 3 The PTR Act was written to achieve
the dual purposes of increasing incentives for research and providing
competing products to the market more quickly. The courts' interpretation of section 271 (e)(1), however, is contrary to these goals.
Section 271(e)(1) was never intended to shelter companies who
have no intention of waiting until the expiration of the relevant patent to release their infringing products into the market. To allow
such activity weakens patent rights and decreases the incentive to
engage in expensive research and development. This is clearly contrary to the reasons given by Congress for the passing of section 201
of the PTR Act,'

which provides for the extension of patent

terms. 1 25 The court's interpretation of section 271(e)(1) is also contrary to explicit language in the legislative history of section
271(e)(1), which clearly states that the exemption is intended to alas soon as possible
low competing products to enter the marketplace
26
after the expiration of the pioneer patents.1
Nor was section 271 (e) (1) intended to prevent companies from obtaining an early adjudication of their rights while they are engaged
in seeking FDA approval. This would also serve to deter companies
from investing in the development of new drugs and medical devices.
In addition, the holdings of the courts in these recent cases are
123. H.R. REP. No. 857, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 30 (1984), reprinted in
1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2686, 2714.
124. Codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. § 156 (1984).
125. H.R. REP. No. 857, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 6 (1984), reprintedin 1984
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2686, 2690. "[P]roponents of [patent term restoration] have argued that
without some form of legislative relief in this area there would be a diminished stimulus
to innovation and research. Thus, it is argued patent term extensions will create incentives for increased expenditures." Id.
126. H.R. REP. No. 857, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 15 (1984), reprinted in
1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2647, 2648.
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inconsistent with the purpose of the remedy of declaratory judgments.1 27 There is a strong need in intellectual property cases for
early adjudication of rights because damages can quickly become
staggering. These damages are passed on to consumers and eliminate
resources which could be used to develop new technologies. Thus, the
courts' denial of declaratory actions when one party is under the exemption of section 271(e)(1) ultimately harms society. This is
clearly contrary to the purpose of the United States Patent system.
The courts are determined to expand section 271(e)(1) from the
original, limited compromise between generic and pioneer pharmaceutical manufacturers, to a broad experimental use exception. Nowhere in the legislative history of the PTR Act was such a broad
exception envisioned. A broad experimental use exception weakens
patents and deters investment in research and development.
Congress clearly defined its objectives in passing the PTR Act: to
make low cost generic drugs available to the public as quickly as
possible, and to encourage expenditures on the development of new
drugs. By interpreting section 271(e) (1) as requiring the denial of all
declaratory judgment suits when one party is engaged in FDA trials,
the courts are preventing these objectives from being met. If the
courts do not reevaluate their interpretation of the PTR Act, this
legislation could result in harming both the U.S. Patent System and
the American public.
AMY STARK

127. Lukenbach S.S. Co. v. United States, 312 F.2d 545, 548 (2d Cir. 1963). "The
purpose of the declaratory remedy is to 'avoid accrual of avoidable damages to one not
certain of his rights and to afford him an early adjudication without waiting until his
adversary should see fit to begin suit, after damage had accrued.'" Id. (citing and quoting E. Edelmann & Co. v. Triple-A. Specialty Co., 88 F.2d 852 (7th Cir. 1937)).
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